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to test three hypotheses . Percentage of  electoral margin for each 
Conunitteeman is a lso presented to determine its impact on members' 
voting . 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The Hbusc sits . : . to sanction the conclu�ion 
of its Conunittccs . . . .  It legislates in its committcc­
rooms'; not by the dctcrmino tions of maj orities , but 
by the resolutions of specially-commissioned minori­
ties; so that it is not far from the truth to say 
that Congress in session is Congress on public exhi­
bition, whilst Congress in its committee-rooms is 
Congress a t  work .l 
Many political scientists have written about the power and 
autonomy of congress ional committees . Each of the committees is 
viewed as a political subsystem of its larger body--the House of 
Representatives or the Sena t e .  One standing committee in Congress 
functions in a different capacity than the others . It  has been 
credit�d with having "more to  say about the final legislative 
output. than any other group on Capitol Hill 
.112 This subsystem is 
the House Committee on Rules . 
The Committee was not originally supposed to  function as a 
legislative committee, but . rather as a "traffic cop" which would 
objectively s ift out the relatively important legislation from the 
1
woodrow Wilson, Congress ional Government (New York: 
Meri4ian Books , 1 956) , p .  6 9 .  
2 . James A .  Robinson, The House Rules Committee (New _York: 
Bobbs -Merrill Company, Inc . ,  1963) , p .  2 .  
1 
2 
c�>mp�1r:itivcly unimport<rnt an<l allot priority time an<l rnorc.: f<.ivor­
�1b.ll.! discussion rules to the more important bills. IIowc.:vc.:r, time.: 
and hum<.ln nature have· changed the ComrnittC:!c' s. primary role. The 
11 tra (fie cop"· function has given way to what might be tc.:rrne<l a 
'"r.oa<lblock" role, whereby ·the Conm1ittee often judges .::i bill's 
floor' .::igen<la. stl.::itus .not by its overall significance but by the way 
a m<.ljority of the Comrnitt'ee ' s  members react politicaily to the 
purpose or substance of a bill . Consequently, the Committee does 
function as a de facto legislative committee,  and a very powerful 
one which judges . ot�er committees ' labors. 
The purpose of this thes is is to examine the voting be­
havior of Rules Committee members. More· ·specifically , the goal is 
tb  explore the possible.impact of constituency interest on Committee 
members ' roll -call voting on the House ·floor . 
The second chapter explains the theoretical framework of 
this research . We shall introduce a model ' illustrating the relation­
ship between constituency characteristics and congressme n ' s  voting 
be.havior . Chapter three will review the l i  tera tu re relevant to this 
model; it covers research and research techn�ques used to study con­
stituencies and the effects they may have on representatives ' roll­
call voting. 
Chapter · four is divided into three parts: a separate 
discussion of the 'three hypotheses . Each section will define the 
tenns and operationalize the variables needed for testing the 
validity of the particular hypothesis . 
3 
The Rules Committee is consiclerc<l one of the thrc.:.e top 
committel!s in the House. Chapter five will examine iti; power. 
Sixth chopter presents the findings as they arc applicable 
to the hypotheses an<l subhypothcses tested. A f"inal chapter <lr:aws 
cerL�in conclusions based on the results of this study. It will, 
in o<l<lition, suggest some areas· of research that remain to be 
explored. 
CIIJ\PTER TWO 
THEORETICAL ORIENTATION 
There h.::ivc been a number of studies .which suggest paradigms 
for explaining political behavior.1 
While the range of  influencing factors can be regarded as 
infinite, some variables are clearly more impor tant than others . 
For example, s evere weather may keep a congressman from voting on 
one given day, but over a wide range of non-voting, other factors 
are more useful as explanatory tools . Thus , a congressman may 
regularly avoid voting becaus e of a narrowly divided constituency , 
and he does n ' t  want to antagonize anyone . 
We will sel·ect certain variables from this infinity and limit 
our discussion to them . Matthews and Prothro have developed a model 
which can be adapted to this study. 
1Thrce of the most prominent are: John C .  Wahlke, The 
Legis lative Sys tern (New York: John Wiley & Sons , 1962) , .PP. 3-28; 
Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes , "Constituency Influence in 
Congres s , "  New Perspectives on the House of Representatives , ed. 
·Robert L. P eabody and Nelson W .  Polsby, II (Chicago: Rand McNally 
& Co . ,  1969), pp . 31-53; Donald R. Matthews and James W .  Prothro , 
Negroes and the New Southern Politics (New York: Harcourt , Brace & 
World , Inc . ,  1966), pp . 25-29. 
· 
4 
Constituency 
5 
Fi.gurc 1. 
A P.:ira<ligm of Rules Committee Member1; 
Voting Decisions on Floor Roll Colls 
Connnittcemon' s 
Socio-economic 
Attributes 
Cha ractcri:; tics--......__ 
. . � Committeeman's Committeema n ' s  
i· 
. Attitudes and -----?;> Roll Call 
Institutional � Cognitions Voting 
Characteristics Behavior 
According to this model ,  a Rules Conunittee member's socio-
economic attributes , constituency characteristics , and institutional 
characteristics are factors which cause his attitudes and cognitions . 
These a ttitudes and cognitions in turn cause his voting behavior. 
Socio-economic attributes include such variables as age ,  
education,
.
occupation, or income . Examples of constituency charac-
teristics are such variables as average age of voters , average number 
of years in school , average income , percentage rural and urban, per-
centage Blacks , number of young people in voting group , presence of 
major industry, or congressman ' s  electoral margin . Institutional 
characteristics refer to  such factors as tenure , seniority , committee , 
party, leadership demands , state delegation pressures ,  or demands 
from the executive branch. 
Within the context of this theoretical orientation to  
explaining behavior , this s tudy will a ttempt to  measure the importance 
6 
o[ rural/urban constituency, cl<.:ctoral margin, party �cmbership, 
an<l iJcology us £actors affecting behavior. 
The mo<lcl <lcscribe<l a bove sug�csts that committeemen wlio 
hol<l similar v.::ilues and come from like <listrics will mcik<.: th0ir 
voting decisions in similar ways. Moreover, rural and urb<ln 
conunittcc member::; arc prone to oppose each other not only bc'c<Jusc 
of a difference in characteristics of their rcs�cctive constituencies 
but also because of a difference in the problems which arise.in rural 
3nd urban districts, and a difference in the means by which these 
problems may be solved. 
Electoral . margin may be associated with subsequent voting 
behavior in two ways. 
1 .  If public opinion is more influential a�ong legislators 
who are insecure because of narrow election victories, the represen­
tat.ives with low electoral margins will alter their yoting positions 
in response to fluctuations in public sentiment. Therefore we would 
expect to find no .consistent relationship between electoral margin 
and agricultural or urban policy behavior by conunitteemen. 
2. It is the contention of this paper that the committeemen 
who hold low electoral margin seats cannot afford to be unconcerned 
about their constituents' desires nor offend any group of constituents, 
and this concern will be reflected in their vot.ing records.. Those 
lawmakers with high electoral margins, however, can afford to be less 
concerned with their constituents' wishes and can pursue a more 
? 
in<lcpcn<lcnt course of. action.-
7 
In the next chapter we slwll sec th<it a number of scholars 
lwvc dcscr ibc<l these as more-or -less crucial (or key) cxplana tory 
(<.1cturs: What \vC, in effect, seek to <lo is control the Conun:i.ttc.:c 
infiucncc on behavior. In other wor<l::;, <lrc these factors directly 
influcntiol, or arc they filtered through an<l diminished · in import-
once by the member's pcrccp tion of his conunit tee's importancc1, 
2Throughout this study we will assume that if constituency 
interests are not revealed in members' voting behavior then the 
members are more likely to support their party leaders. 
CHA PT ER THREE 
LITERATURE R,EVIEW 
The major ·work to date on the Rules Committee is James 
Robinson·' s ,  The 
.
House Rules Commit
.
tee . 1 He examined the previous 
congressional experience and constituency backgrounds of members 
of the Committee from 1937 to 1962 . Correlation of  those two 
factors with members ' voting decisions as reflected in roll-ca.11  
votes was made in an  effort to  determine if an  apprenticeship 
period , a safe or competitive constituency, and/or urban or rural 
res idence a ffected their decisions . Data indicated that rural 
districts were more often represented on the Committee than urban 
constituencies based on the rural-urban split on the Committee 
itself ,  and rural representatives tended to be Republicans . A 
majority of the Rules ' membership during this period was elected 
from safe districts as opposed to competitive ones (based on the 
safe-competitiv� proportion on the Committee) . 
Robinson concluded that those factors , while important, 
were not overriding. Committeemen demonstrated a concern that 
1M d . . any sources were rea in preparing 
those most helpful in understanding the role 
in the legislative proces s ,  a.nd .those useful 
votes are presented in this chapter. 
8 
for this study. ·Only 
of the Rules Committee 
in analyzing roll-call 
9 
their votes ofi the floor coincide with the maj ority of votes or at 
least with the leadership of their particular party. 
There is a considerable amount of research which is both 
analytically and methodologically important to congress ional studies . 
Our principal concern in this chapter will be to examine methods of 
analysis , rather than the analysis itself .  We will address ourselves 
to the conclus ions j.n these studies in the next chapter .  
One method of examining cons tituenpy impact . on congress ional 
behavior is to correlate characteristics .-0f the cons tituents --census 
data such as population . density, ethnic background , occupation, wealth 
--with roll-call votes . Duncan MacRa e ,  Jr . compared House roll-call 
voting patterns in the 8lst Congress with the percentage of district 
population engaged in farming and profess ional or managerial occupa-
. 2 tions . He concluded , among other things, that members ' votes corre-
sp.onded most closely to interest groups in their constituencies on 
agricultural matters , in which party, regional and ideological influ-
ences have less impact than in the ·case of other issues . 
Lewis. A .  Froman, Jr . correlated the voting of nonsouthern 
represen_tatives · in 1961 with socio·-economic status (percentage of 
owner-occupied dwelling units),  ra _ce (percentage of nonwhite popu-
lation) , population density (average population per square mile), 
2Dunca� MacR.ae ,  Jr., Dimensions of Congressional Voting 
( Los Angeles.: University of California Press , 1958). 
10 
and place of residence (percentage urban) . 3 Northern Democrats 
tended to represent districts with a smaller percentage of owner-
occupied. dwell ings , higher percentages of nonwhite population and 
urban residents , and a higher average population .density than 
Republicans . Constituency characteristics , in other words , tended 
to reinforce patterns in roll-cqll voting according to party lines . 
Using Congress ional Quarterly scores for roll-call support of 
President Kennedy on domestic issues , Froman found that support 
tended to be higher in both parties in districts with greater 
population density, higher percentages of nonwhites and urban 
res idents , and lower percentages of owner-occupied dwellings . 
W. Wayne Shannon found constituency differences reinforcing 
party differences .4 He �ttempted to explain deviations from party 
positions on roll calls by examining characteristics of the constit-
uencies . Scores for voting scales on a variety of issues in 86th 
and 87th Congresses were compared with selected constituency factors 
-�urban population, percentage of blue-collar workers , and median 
income for the northern Republicans·and Democrats, a �d median income 
and percentage nonwhite population for southern Democrats . 
3 
Lewis A .  Froman,  Jr . ,  Congressmen and Their Constituencies 
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963). 
4w. Wayne Shannon, Party, Constituency and Congress ional 
Voting ( Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Pres s ,  1968) . 
1 1  
Shannon concluded that urban-rural constituency differences 
did not account for intraparty voting differences. Detailed analysis 
of socio-economic-differences indicated that these factors do not aid 
in explanation of.dissent from party positions (however,  party differ­
ences were greatest in the case of representatives from safe districts). 
Warren E. Miller and Do�ald E. Stokes correlated · congressional 
actions and attitudes with constituent opinion expressed in in�erviews 
following the 1958 elections .5 A representative sample of one hundred 
s ixteen House distric�s made-up the survey . Incumbent congressman , 
his opponent (if any), and a sample of constituents were interviewed 
to determine their basic attitudes on federal government action in 
three area s :  social welfare, U. S.  involvement in foreign affairs , 
and civil rights for Blacks . District opinion and representative's 
roll-call votes were ranked on those issues . Cons iderable agreement 
existed on social welfare , a high level of agreement on civil rights, 
and no significant relationship on foreign policy. 
Furthermore , Miller and Stokes identified the paths through 
which constituency opinion influences congressional voting. Apparently 
the importance of small increments of votes in elections , the role of 
informed local leaders in influencing other voters , and the threat 
that an opponent will publicize unpopular actions tended to bring 
the representative's roll-call votes into agreement with the basic 
5Miller and Stokes: 
1 2  
·attitudes of  his consti .tuents . This harmony was achieved by voters 
selecting a man whose own attitudes were a lready s imilar to theirs , 
and by representatives being guided by their perceptions of  constit-
uent opinion. 
It should be noted that Miller and Stokes developed their 
constituency data from interviews , while the. data developed by 
MacRae,  Froman,  and �hannon came from the aggregate data in the U. S. 
Census . 
Juli�s Turner used Rice indices of  cohesion and likeness in 
studying the 1921 , 1931 , 1937 and 1944 sessions of  the Hous e . 6 
Analysis of the roll-call votes for those years showed Republicans 
being generally less divided along urban-rural l ines than Democrats . 
Overall, the political party of a member was more closely asso.ciated 
with voting behavior than any other factor. Tendencies of congress-
men to vote with their party or to cross party lines were associated 
with the similarity or dissimilarity between party policy and presumed 
interests of constituencies . 
6Julius Turner,  Party and Constituency: . Pressures on Congreis 
(Baltimore : The Johns Hopkins Pres s ,  1951). Cohesion is defined as 
the extent to which the distribution of v.ot ·es on a legislative roll 
call deviates from the distribution that would be expected if all 
influences op�rated randomly.  The index of likeness measures the 
difference between two groups in their response to a roll call . 
1 3  
David Truman� like Turner ,  found party membership to be 
the. inost reliable indicator of co
.
ngressional voting behavior .7 
He studied bo�h congressional parties and their leaders ' rdll-call 
votes on the floor of the Hotise and Senate . during the 8lst Congress ,  
using the technique of voting bloc analysis . This consists of count-
ing the number of agreements in .each House between each party member 
and every other party member on a series of selected rol l -call votes , 
ordered on the basis of their index of party cohesion. Blocs were 
compared with the personal characteristics of members and their con-
stituencies , majority and minority party status , leadership influence , 
s tate delegation, and regional cohesion. One of Truman ' s  maj or points 
was that although the Republican party had a higher pa.rty cohesion 
score in the Hous e ,  their leaders were more divided than were their 
Democratic counterparts . 
Another examination of party and constituency influence on 
legislative voting behavior is David M�yhew ' s ,  Party Loyalty Among 
Congressmen. 8 Representatives were classified as either "farm" 
congressmen, "city" congressmen, "labor" congressmen, or " Western" 
congressmen according to ·the principal characteristic of their 
district . They were then categorized into "interested" and re1.atively 
7 navid B .  Truman, The Congressional Party: A Case Study 
(New York: Wiley, 1959) . 
8David R.  Mayhew , Party Loyalty Among Congressmen (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press , . 1966) . 
14 
"indifferent" congressmen ·on the bas is of  their roll-ca 11  voting 
behavior on bills which could be c.ategorized a long the same four 
dimens ions . 
Mayhew used the Rice index of  likeness as a measure of.  the 
similarity between two voting blocs such as Democratic "farm" and 
"nonfarm" congressmen·. . Rice index of cohesion was used to measure · 
the degree of  unity exhibited by any one voting bloc . Democrats 
from "interested" districts maintained higher cohesion than ·Demo­
crats from "indifferent" districts . The reverse was true for 
Republicans; members from "indifferent" districts demonstrated 
greater unit� than members from "interested" districts . 
CHAPTER FOUR 
HYPOTHESES 
This research will explore three hypotheses concerning Rules 
Committee members ?nd the effect their constituencies may have on 
members ' roll-call voting .on the House floor . 1 
Hypothesis I 
· Lewis Froman ,  Jr . . suggested that because constituents vary, 
the impact of issues upon constituents varies . Therefore, "congress-
men from different types of constituencies are likely to  vote differ-
en
.
tly on matters of public policy, and those from s imilar constitu­
encies are likely to vote in similar ways . ' a Note·that Froma n ' s  
s tudy did'not control for committee membership . Does Rules Committee 
membership weaken his conclusion about the relationship between con-
s tituency and congressmani 
Hypothesis I. If  an issue is seen to a ffect substantial 
interests in a Rules Committee member ' s  constituency, then he will 
support those interests . 
1rn analyzing the rela tionships between variables , it is 
expected that no single test of a hypothesis will show that two 
concepts are unrelated;· but will only indicate that certain opera­
tional definitions are not associa ted with each other . Several 
negative tests, utilizing · a variety of  operational definitions 
for the same coneepts , would be required before concluding that 
there is no relationship between or among the concepts . 
2Froman, p .  85 . 
1 5  
16  
The measure of "substantial interests" to  be  used is the 
predominance of rural or urban interests in a congress ional dis-
trict . Then . "Rules Conuni ttee membe r ' s  cons tituency" is cha r<:ictcr-
i�ed as either rural or urban. An indicator of "support" is the 
floor roll calls on selected rural and urban issues for the 90th 
and 9lst Congresses in which members ' votes show if they are pro 
or con on an issue . � 
Division of constituencies into rural and urban was a ccom-
plished according to Robins on ' s  definition of "rural districts ."  
That is , rural districts are those having four or more counties , 
"unless a large metropolitan area obviously dominates several out­
lying counties !14 All other districts are treated as  urban .  This 
technique produces eight rural and seven urban districts on the 
Corranittee . Congressmen from these districts will be known as  
"rµral Committee members" or "urban Committee members" depending 
on their particular  population distribution. 
Rural members include Democrats Colmer,  Sisk,5 Young, Matsu-
naga , and Anderson; Republicans Martin, Quillen, and Latta . . Urban 
3 Members paired for or announced for a roll call are treated 
as supporting it while those pa ired against or announced against are 
opposed to it . 
4Robinson, p .  101 . 
5 Although only two counties are included in Sis k ' s  district ,  
he is  identified here as a rural member because he also  serves on 
the Agriculture Committee . 
17 
constituencies are represented by Democrats Madden , Delancy, Bolling, 
0 'Ne ill ,  and Pepper; Republ icons Smith and Anderson . 6 
The final s t.ep necessary to examine the hypothesis is select-
ing those roll calls which affect rural and urban activities . Roll 
calls are included if they are on matters considered to be of special 
concern to the designated interested representatives on the Rules 
Conu11ittee .  Any of  those roll calls on which ninety percent. or more 
of  the House voted on the same side of the question are excluded . 
When two or more roll calls for the same bill show all members voting 
identically, only one of those roll calls is selected for analysis . 
Votes were collected from the 1 967 , 1968 , 1969,  and 1970 editions of 
the Congress ional Quarterly Almanac .  
Agricultural roll calls cover farm support programs , cotton 
import quota reduction, agricultural fair-trading practices for com-
modities , farm loan interest rates, peanut acreage allotment , fruit 
market , and potato market. Roll calls which affect urban l ife include 
urban renewal projects , public housing programs , and urban mass trans-
portatio? systems . 
Obviously, not all of the agricultural issues discussed affect 
every rural Committeeman equally since a particular farm program may 
be · more relevant to his constituents . One of  the " givens" in the body 
6Anderson (Il .) is class ified as an urban member although he 
has more than fo�r counties in his district . The proximity of  Chicago 
to the district, and the location of the second largest Illinois city 
in .his district a ccounts for the classification. 
· 
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of l.rnowlcdgc about congressional voting, however ,  is that a con-
grcssma� wil� vote for another repres entative ' s  bill in hopes of 
getting a <l<litional support from him for his · own legislation. If 
this norm applies to  the House membership in general then it is 
proba.bly even more true of a particular subsystem--the Rules 
C . b . l . 7 ommittee mcm ers1ip . 
Two subhypotheses are generated from the · main hypothesi.s .  
Subhypothesis I. Rural Committeemen are more likely to 
support agricultural programs than are urban members . 
Subhypothesis II. Urban Committeemen are more likely to  
support programs designed for the cities than are rural members . 
Measurement o� these concepts is possible by applying the 
definitions discussed in the hypothesis . Then the decision as to 
which group is more likely to· vote for · rural or urban programs is 
based on the number of times each member suppor�s his bloc's issue . 
Dat.a will be expressed in terms of mean percentages of support . 
7of course ,  in the case where one farm program is forced to  
compete with another for funds or attention, then a member ' s  loyalty 
would be to the program which would have the greatest effect on the 
people "back home ."  To make this determination requires a more de:­
tailed study of the consti�uencies than is undertaken in the present 
analysis . These comments apply equally to urban roll calls .  A 
cursory inspection of the data in this study suggests very strongly 
' that this o.ccurrence is quite rare insofar as Rules Committee members 
are concerned . 
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If the mean percentage is higher for rura l than urban 
Cummittecmcn on farm issues , then the first subhypothesis will have 
been validated . But if the mean percentage is grea ter for urban 
than rural members then this may be an indicator of the invalidity 
o( the assumption. A similar analytical assumption holds for the 
second hypothes is . 
For the hypothesis. to be valid, both subhypotheses must hold 
true . If  only one secondary proposition holds true then the major 
hypothes�s will have been only partially validated. Moreover, if 
both subhypotheses remain in doubt then the hypo�hesis too will not 
have been proven (although it may be validated by a more refined 
construction of variables) . 
How s ignificant are the differences between the voting-blocs 
on each issue? Turner reconunended the ·use of Rice ' s  index of like­
nes.s as the best measurement of party difference on a se·t of issues. 8 
This index will .be adapted to rural and urban blocs rather than party 
a ffiliation. Then , the index of likeness will measure the s imilarity 
between rural and urban members on agricultural roll calls , and urban 
and rural members on city-oriented roll calls . In other words , it 
will show the quantitative difference in support between the two 
groups on each set of  issues. 
8Turner,  p .  36. 
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llypothc:-;is II 
Docs the fact that some congressmen arc in grea ter danger of  
losing office since they come .from competitive districts a ffec.:t their 
voting in Congres::;? If congrcs::;men arc influenced by their cons tit-
ucnts, then a na tural corollary is that a congrc::;sman .from <.i highly 
competitive district will be even !!!£!£ attentive . 9 Again, we seek 
i:o <lctcrminc if Rule::; Committee membership exert� an inclepenclcnt 
influence on a congressma n ' s  attention to his constituents. 
Hypothesis II. The more competitive the district , the more 
likely Committeemen will support constituency interests.  
In defining "the more competitive the district" is meant the 
percentage of  electoral victory for a Rules member avera·ged over the 
last  five elections (1962, 1964, 1966, 1968, and 1970) as recorded 
in Richard Scammon ' s  America Votes �nd · the 1970 edition of  Congres-
sional Quarterly Weekly Report . Electoral victories or margins are 
classified into high and low categories by rural-urban membership . 
Ru.ral members with high margins include Colmer,  Young,  Anderson 
(Tennessee) , and Quillen; those with low are Latta , Sisk, Matsunaga , 
and Martin. Urban members with high margins include O 'Netll, Pepper, 
and Smith; those with low are Anderson (Illinois) , Delaney , Bolling, 
and Madden . 
. 9nuncan. MacRa e ,  Jr . ,  "The Relation Between Roll Call Votes 
and Constituencies ,"  Legislative Behavior,  eel .  John C .  Wahlke and 
Heinz Eulau ( Glencoe , Il . :  The Free Press ,  1959), 197. 
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"Support. constituency interests" denotes 
·a rura l or urban 
Conunittccmon' s floor roll -ca 11 vote in favor of agricultural or  city 
lcgislatibn . (Sec Hypothesis I above for description of issues and 
roll -coll selection.) 
With Hyp�thcsis II thus defined , it will be operationalized 
by applying these definitions to two subhypotheses . 
Subhypothesis I .  Rural Committeemen with low electoral mar­
gins arc more likely to support a gricultural ·programs than a re rural 
members with high electoral victories . 
Subhypothesis II. Urban Conunitteemen with low electoral mar­
gins a re more likely to support city programs than a re urban members 
with high electoral victories . 
These a ssumptions will be tested by calculating the mean 
percentages for rural members of high and low electoral margins and 
urban members of high and low margins . Then ' .the significance of these 
relationships will be tested by the index of likeness . It will· measu�e 
the s imilarity between rural Committeemen of high and low margins on 
fa rm roll calls , and urban Committeemen of high and low margins on. 
ci.ty roll calls . 
I f  the mean percentage for rural members with low electoral 
margins o� agricultural roll calls is greater than that for those with 
high margins , then Subhypothesis I will be valid .  But if the mean 
percentage for rural Committeemen with high electoral margins on farm 
roll calls is greater. - than that for those with . low margins , then the 
validity of the proposition will be questionabl e .  A similar line of 
reasoning will hold for the second hypothesis . 
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The central hypothesis will have been proven if both subhypo-
theses arc valid. If only one subhypothesis is valid then the hypo-
thesis will be only partially true . However, if both subhypothesos 
arc found to be · invalid then the hypothesis should be rejected . 
Hypothesis III · 
Charles O .  Jones in "The Agriculture Cornmittec and the Problem 
of  Representation" found tha t ,  "If a measure is seen to have little or 
no direct effect on interests in a representative ' s  legal constituency, 
then he will tend more readily to look to his political party for a 
cue when he acts in regard to this measure . 1110 . 
. 
When a program does not a ffect a Rules Committee members ' 
constituency directly, he is . more likely to vote wit� his party . Froman 
hypothesized the following . 
The more competitive the district , the more likely con­
stituency preferences will be reflected in legislative 
roll-call votes . This proposition follows from the 
idea that representatives from competitive districts , 
because of  the greater heterogeneity of  their consti- · 
tuents , are more likely than representatives from safe 
districts to find the interests of some of their con­
stituents to conflict with party pressures. Because 
their electoral margins are close , these representa­
tives may feel compelled to submit to these. pressures 11 and hence will be less likely to vote with their party. 
Combining the second hypothesis with Jones and Froman ' s  
comments , a new hypot�esis can be formulated: 
Hypothesis III .  The more competitive the district, the less 
likely it is that the representative will v.ote with his party. 
10 
Charles O .  Jones , "The Agriculture Committee and the 
Problem of Representation , "  New Perspectives on the House of  
Representatives , ed. Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W .  Polsby, II 
(Chicago: Rand McNally & 'co . ,  1969), 172 .  
11Froman,  p .  85 . 
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"Vote with his party" means that a Committeeman's vote 
ogrccs with his· leadership 1 s posit ion .  
To test this hypothes is , two subhypothcses arc examined . 
Subhypothes is I .  Rural Committee members with high electoral 
margins ore more likely to support their party leaders on agricultural 
is�ues th<,1n arc rural members with low margins . 
Subhypothesis II . Urban Committee members with high electoral 
margins arc more likely to support their party leaders on city issues 
than are urban members with low margins . 
Leade·rs of the Democratic party in 90th and 9lst Congresses 
were Carl Albert-O klahoma, majority leader, and Hale Boggs-Louisiana, 
majority whip. For the Republ icans , the leadership during this period 
was Gerald Ford-Michigan; minority leader, and Leslie Arends -Illinois, 
minority whip . (See Hypotheses I and II for definitions of other 
terms . )  
In analyzing members and leaderships ' votes , roll calls were 
selected from the original for'ty-six on wh.ich both leaders of a party 
agreed, or if one leader was absent then . .  the vote of the othe r leader 
.was used to indicate a party ' s  position. Both parties ' p os itions are 
known 'for thirty-five roll calls . On seven extra roll calls the 
Democratic (but not the Republican) stand ca n be ascertained . . Three 
additional roll calls are useful in gauging rural and urban Repub-
1 icans ' agreement �ith their leadership . In all,  forty-two roll calls 
will be compared for the Democrats and thirty-eigh� for the Republicans . 
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Roll calls will be analyzed by calculating the percentage 
of times Committeemen agreed with their leadership . If  the per­
centage of agreement for rural Conunittee members with high electoral 
morgins is hi.gher on agricultural issues than it is for rurnl mc.:mbcrs 
with low mnrgins, then the first subhypothesis will have some valid­
ity . But if the pcr.centage is higher for rural members with low 
margins then the propos it.ion '. s concepts (as operationally defined) 
a rc not val id . A similar generalization applies to the second hypo­
thes is . 
Thus , both subhypotheses will have to hold true for the main 
hypothesis to be proven . If  only one subhypothesis is true then the 
hypothesis will have been partially validated . And if  both assump� 
tions ·are proven incorrect, then the original proposition will have 
to be rejected. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
RULES COMMITTEE IN PERSPECTIVE 
Rules Committee has existed as a standing committee s ince 
188q; its principal respons ibility lies in its power to schc<luie 
business to be considered by the full House an<l to suggest rules 
to govern such cons ide·ration (such as the amount of time budgeted 
for debate on bills and the number of amendments that can be offered 
from the floor on each bill) . Beginning in 1892 Committee reports 
were designated matters of "special and high privilege" with only 
a motion to adjourn and no. other dilatory motions in order during 
their considera tions . 
Committee assumption of  its authority received a boost in 
the 1930 ' s .  Ch�irman John J .  O ' Connor and his colleagues came to 
believe that the Committee should play a definite role in the 
writing of legislation, and that issuing rules should become a 
secondary function outweighed by susbstantive control of  measures . 
A bipartisan conservative coalition of  southern Democrats and · 
Republicans on the Committee were success ful in blocking several 
of Franklin Rooseve l t ' s  proposals including the Wage and Hour bill . 
The power of  the Committee continued to be felt in succeed­
ing sessions . This was accomplished primarily by members refusing 
to relinquish their right of  independent judgment . 
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Combining his influence as the unofficial leader of the 
southern delegation and head of  Rules , Howard W .  Smith was able to 
block, delay, and weaken legislation he o·pposed, both in the Cormnit­
tcc room and on the flo0r. Liberals gained another vote and increased 
their majority to nine when Smith left the Committee . Since then, 
the Speaker has been given stronger support from the Committe e ,  although 
the members s till occasionally steal the legislative show in their 
role of independent representatives . 
Committee on Rules has jurisdiction over the rules , joint 
rules , order of business of the House,  recess , and final adjournments 
of C0ngress .  Its primary jurisdiction is over proposals to make or 
change rules of p+ocedure , for the creation of corranittees a.nd author­
izing and/or directing them to make investigations. 
What makes this fifteen-member · subsystem' s  power appear so 
awesome? It commands the power to perform the following. functions : 
session . 
1 .  Give or withhold hearings for ruies . 
2. Give or withhold rules . 
3 .  Trade a change in a bill for a rul e .  
4. Permit o r  forbid amendments and set the l ength o f  debate . 
5 .  Take advantage· of time constraints near the end of a 
6.  Arbitrate differences between legislative committees . 
7. Initiate action in the absence of legislative committee 
decisions . 
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Some of the decisions made by the Committee include vJh�t 
bills will b9 considered in the House , and when. A controversial 
bill gets onto the House agenda when its legislative committee 
chairman writes a letter to the Rules Committee requesting a hearing 
to obtain a rule so the bill can be considered on the floor. The 
p ower to decide whether the bill should be considered by the House 
at  all rests with the Rules Committee . Even if its decision is 
a [ firm� tive, it still may specify the length of time a bill will be 
debated , what motions may be made, and whether or not amendments may 
be proposed on t.he floor. Nevertheless, the Committee ' s  authority 
is not limited to the role of "traffic cop , "  but also includes 
discussing each bill ' s  merits, and occasionally the decision to grant 
a rule depends on whether or not Committee members favor the bill 
itself .  Committeemen have even been ·.known t o  bargain with lea'ders 
of legislative committees to ensure that certai� objectionable fea­
tures of a bill are eliminated before they are willing to grant a 
rul e .  
Rules Committee ' s  frequent delays in granting rules t o  contro­
versial legislation has built itself into the House role system often­
times to the point of affecting the nature of bills reported by the 
substantive committees in advance of Rules Committee screening . For 
example, if a committee majority sensed the. tendency of the Rules 
Committee to question all or part of a bill being considered by the 
legislative committee, it is not unrealistic to expect the legisla­
tive committee to modi.fy · its position on a bill to informally accom-
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modatc Rules Committee attitudes in advance of the bill ' s  fonnal 
·appearar\ cc before the Committee . 
Thus , the controversy over the Committee's assumption of  
a substantive role in addition to its formally ass igned duties 
stems from general llouse rQluctance to interfere with established 
Conunittce prerogatives , even though these prerogatives sometimes 
a l ter the fundament�l role of  the House itself .  
One committee may at  times appear more important or news­
worthy than others . However,  this atteneion will last only a 
. season or two; and then . another conunittee will emerge from the 
wings and become the new star on Capitol Hill . Regardless of 
who is center stage at the moment, Rules Committee members still 
have some say about how the show is finally written and produced, 
because of a committee system which requires that important acts 
receive the approval of the Conunittee on Rules . 
CHAPTER SIX 
DATA ANALYSIS 
Tes ting of the hypotheses produce the findings presented in 
this chapter. The dependent variable is voting behavior .  Factors 
that might cause this behavior include the independent variables 
of rural/urban cons tituency, and a member ' s  electoral margin. We 
will control for. party membership and ideology . 
Rural Committeemen do support. agriculture more often than 
urban members (Table 1) . Both rural and urban legislators voted 
for agricultural programs more often during the first two years of 
the Nixon administration (9lst Congress) than in earlier Congresses . 
In the 90th Congress , for example, urban members opposed agriculture 
53 percent of the time . Although they do not give agriculture as 
much s·upport as rural members in 1969 and· 1970, urban members sus­
tain farm programs with greater regularity than that with which 
they oppose them. 
Urban Committeemen ' s  support of urban issues is greater tha·n 
that of farm representatives (Table 2) . City programs are treated 
more favorably by both groups in 1 967 and 1 968 . There is only a two 
percent difference in support-oppos ition for rural congressmen . This 
bloc is evenly divided in their position for the 9lst Congress . 
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The likeness index reveals a higher unification of  support 
by Rules Corranit t.ec members for 1969 and 1970 on both agricul tura 1 
and urban roll calls . 
Table l 
Roll-Coll Votes on Agricultural Programs 
ny Rules Committee Members, 1967-1970 
Vo t<'s 
90th Con rcss 
Support Agriculture 
Oppose Agriculture 
Total 
Likeness Index 
Committeemen 
Rural Urban 
N=8 N=7 
72% 
28 
100% 
65.8% 
47% 
53 
100% 
Table 2 
Votes 
9lst Con rcss 
Committeemen 
Rural Urban 
N=8 N=7 
Support A griculuture 75% 56% 
Oppose Agriculture 25 44 
Total 100% 100% 
Likeness Index 80 . 8% 
Roll-Call Votes on City Programs 
By Rules Committee Members, 1967-1970 
Votes 
90th Con ress 
Support Cities 
Oppose Cities 
Total 
Likeness Index 
Connnitteemen 
Urban Rural 
N=7 N=8 
7 3% 
27". 
100% 
72. 2% 
51% 
49 
100% 
Votes 
9lst Con ress 
Support Cities 
Oppose Cities 
Total 
Likeness Index 
Urban 
N=7 
Rural 
N=8 
66% 50% 
34 50 
100% 100% 
8 5 . 8% 
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· The Influence of Rural-Urban Fnctor 
Individual support for farm and city programs by rural 
members in both Cong.resses is examined in Table three . Young 
. . 
has the highest score on agricultural roll calls with 92 percent , 
while Martin ' s  43 percent in<lica tes that he rej cc ts farm programs 
more often than he sustains them. Overa l l ,  the other members choose 
to support rural interests . 
Table 3 
Per�cntage of Support by Rural Committeemen 
On Farm and City Programs , 
90th and 9lst Congresses 
. Programs 
Farm City 
Rural Members (N=31) (N=l 5) 
Colmer 71% 0% 
Sisk 85 100 
Young 92 74 
Matsunaga 89 100 
Anderson (Tenn .) 80 80 
Martin 43 1 3  
Quillen 70 33 
Latta 55 7 
Mean 7 3% 51% 
Members do not vote as a bloc on city issues . S isk and 
Matsunaga have 100 pe�cent support . Anderson (Tenn .)  and Young 
vote in favor of cities on most occasions . These programs receive 
no assistance from Colmer. 
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Table 4 measures an urban congressman ' s  support for city and 
farm programs in the 90th and 9lst Congresses . Most members display 
overall support on city votes . Congressmen Smith and Anderson (Il .) 
arri exceptions . Peppe r ' s  record demonstrates the greatest s trength 
(100 percent) ; Smith ' s ,  the least (7  percent) . Referring to Table 3 ,  
we  find that all  but two rural members support city interests more 
often than urban Committeeman Smith. 
Table 4 
P·erccntage of Support by Urban Committeemen 
On City and Farm Programs- , 
90th and 9lst Congresses 
Programs 
City Farm 
Urban Members (N=l5) (N=31) 
Madden 87% 44% 
Delaney 80 25 
Bolling 93 69 
0 'Neill 93 62  
Pepper 100 74 
Smi-th 7 24 
Anderson (Il .) 27 53 
Mean 70% 50% 
In regard to voting on �arm issues by urban members , three 
a re against and four are in favor.  · So while rural members take a 
divided stand on city matters , the urban bloc ge_nerally sustains 
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farm interests. Pepper not only has the highest percentage of 
support on urban a ffairs , but also he shows the greatest strength 
on agricultural matters . Rural interes ts received the leas t  favor­
able consideration from Smith and Delaney. 
The Influence of Party 
What role does party a llegiance play in a member ' s  decision? 
Figure 2 illustrates rural and urban Committeemen ' s  support of agri� 
cultural and urban concerns for both Congresses with party membership 
being controlled.  Democrats vote for rural and urban programs more 
often than Republicans . The bulk of Republican support goes to rural 
programs . 
On 83 percent of  �he agricultural roll calls , the rural Demo­
crats yielded to their constituent majorities . Urban Democrats �ppear 
to support farm measures rather than oppose them. In fact , the 
closeness of  Republican rural and Democratic urban members ' percent­
age of support indicates that Democrats generally favor agricultural 
interests , or more so than Republicans . 
Urban roll calls receive greater support from Democrats too; 
their rura l membership fol�ows urban Democrats in casting 71 percent 
of  their votes for cities . Republican urban members show little 
interest in urban interests . Republican rural members a ctually show 
a s lightly higher percentage of support for urban programs than 
Republican urban members (18% to 17%) . 
These findings suggest that party indentification may be an 
important factor in explaining membership behavior .  
F igure 2 
Rules Committee Members Mean Percentage of Support on Agricultural and City Roll Calls 
B P a rty, 90th and 9 l s t  Congresses ���������������--'-��---. 
Democratic Rural Members (N=5) 
Republ ican Rural Members (N=3) 
Democratic Urban Members (N=5) 
Republican Urban Members (N=2) 
Demo.era t i c  Rura 1 -Urban 
Likeness Index 
Republican Rural -Urban 
Likeness Index 
Democrat ic-Republican 
Likeness Index 
Agricultura� Roll Calls 
(N::=:31) 
100% 
69 . 7% 
64 . 6% 
60 . 4% 
Urban Roll Ca l l s  
(N=l5) 
100% 
74 . 7% 
87 . 6% 
33 . 7% 
w 
+' 
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The Influence of Ideology 
Docs . a member ' s  political philosophy affect his voting? We 
will explore this poss�bility by controll in� for ideology . The 
Americans For Democratic Action ' s  1968 rating is used to class ify 
Committeemen as liberal or conservative (see Figures 3 and 4) . 
Figure 3 
Relationship l3ctwccn Ideology and Agricultural Support, 
90th and 9ls t  Congresses 
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An examination of Figure 3 does not produce evidence for the 
argument that conservat_ives and not liberals support agriculture . 
The reverse is true of the Rules Committee membership . Figure 4 
suggests that as the mean percentage of support for city programs 
increases , both urban and rural rcpresenta.tives have a tendency to 
be more libera l .  
.w 
H 
0 
0. 
0. 
· ;:\ (/) 
4--l 
0 
QJ 
00 
cu .w 
c 
QJ (,) 
H 
QJ 
P-1 
c 
cu 
QJ 
� 
Figure 4 
Relationship Between Ideology and Urban Support, 
90th and 9ls t Congresses 
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We conclude that liberal Committeemen (rural and urban) arc 
more likely to sustain agricultural and city projects than conscrva-
tivcs . Therefore, ideology is a consequental factor in explaining 
voting behavior . 
Th� Influence of Elections 
District competitiveness is measured by Rules Committeemen ' s  
electoral margin . Data in Table 5 shows representatives of  rural 
constituencies voting for farm programs whether their percentage of  
victory is high or low . Rural Congressmen from the less competitive 
districts (high electoral marg�ns) give agriculture greater support 
than rural. members from the more .competitive districts (low electoral 
ma·rgin�) • So rural members opposed to agriculture usually come from 
the more competitive districts . 
Table 5 
Comparison of  Roll-Call Votes on Agricultural Programs to 
Percentages of Electoral Margins of Rural Committeemen, 
90th and 9lst Congresses 
Votes 
Support Agriculture 
Oppose Agriculture 
Total 
Index of Likeness 
Rural Committeemen 
Electoral Margin 
Low High 
(N=4) (N=4) 
68% 
32 
100% 
81 . 7% 
78% 
2 2  
100% 
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Urban representritiv?s , regardless of electoral margins , 
support urban programs (see Table 6) . Cities get a higher percent-
age of ass istance from the more compe titive urban constituencies .  
Opposition is more likely to come from Committeemen who have scored 
greater victories at  the polls . 
Table 6 
Comparison of Roll -Call Votes on City Programs to 
Percentage of  Electoral Margins. of Urban Committeemen , 
90th and 91st  Congresses 
Vot\'.!S 
Support Cities 
Oppose Cities 
Total 
Index of Likeness 
Urban Committeemen 
Electoral Margin 
Low High 
(N=4) (N=3) 
7 2% 
28 
100% 
85 . 2% 
67% 
3 3 ·  
100% 
The difference between those with high and low "wins" is 
more significant for rural congressmen on agricultural roll calls 
(18 . 3  percent) than for urban members on city issues (14 .8  percent) . 
Therefore, urban representatives are more united in their support 
of  constituent interests than rural Corranitteemen. 
Figure 5 gauges the support of  agriculture by rural and 
urban Committeemen based on their electoral margin. Party member-
ship is the control variable .  
Rural Democrats with lower margins--Sisk and Matsunaga--
give the highest percentage of support to farm programs (87 percent) . 
Anderson (Il .) is an urban Republican with a low margin who supports 
Low Electoral Margin Support High Electoral Margin Support 
m .� 877& ff/�� Democra t i c  (���;l Memebrs 
49% 
(N=l) 
53% 
Republican Rural Members 
�=� 
Democra t i c  Urban Members 
(N=5) 
Republican Urban Members 
(N=2) 
(N=l) 
:XY�'\:'91 70% �6,o.t'>," XV\' "').,,, ��1 
68% 
(N=l) 
�  I 24% 
F i gure 5 .  Cormnitteemen ' s  Support o f  A g r icultural Roll Calls 
w \!:) 
100% 
Low Electoral :Margin Support High Electoral Hargin Sup?ort 
, . Democratic Urban :Members 
a1% V/7111/TIT/l II /T/li1 <N=s) 
/'.. _'rJ. Republican Urban Members 27% V 17///I (N=2) 
Democra t i c  Rural Members 
(N=S) 
(N=2)! Republican Rural Members 
10%� (N::;l) 33% 
Figure 6 .  Conunitteemen ' s  Support of Urban Roll Calls 
51% � 0 
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rur;.1 1 concern8 .. Tho8c voicing t h e i r  approvul on the Ill.git rrw rgin 
:; i<lc ' inc lu<le rura l an<l urban Democrats Colme r ,  Young,  Anderson 
(Tenn .) , 0 ' Ne ill ::rn<l Peppe r ,  and rural Republican Quillen . · · 
The Republican rural members from the more competitive 
<lis tricts--Martin and Lotta --are less likely to vote for agricul-. -
turc than is Quillen with a high margin . O 'Neill and Pepper with 
higher constituent s trength and Anderson (Il . )  with a low margin 
display higher percentages than Martin and Latta from low margin 
districts . 
Party membership is important as an explanation of the 
behavior of  Committeemen from the more competitive ru�al constitu-
encies (refer to Table 5) . It is less relevant in understanding the 
relationship between constituency influence and roll-call voting for 
rural Congressmen with high electoral �argins . 
Urban ·roll calls receive their greatest strength from Demo-
cra'ts (see Figure 6). . Coming from rurC\l constituencies does not 
stop rural Democrats from voting in favor of  city programs . They 
support all fifteen roll calls . While these rural members are 
giving urban a ffairs a boost ,  their compatriots with high margins 
show almost 50 percent · opposition. 
Republican congressmen v0te as a bloc ag�inst urban projects . 
Ironically, what Republican support exists comes mainly from Quillen, 
a rural member who demonstrates a high percentage of electoral plur-
·al ity . At' the same time rural Republicans with low margins , Martin 
and L·atta , show the most opposition. 
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c�n1 trqllinlj [or porty i::; a more f rultful exercise for 11ri><.m 
mcmhct·s \.,rho pos t high c l c c tor<.11 victories tlwn i t  is for repr��senta-
tivcs irom the more competitive urban constituencies .  The:: import-
ancc o[ e lectorol morgin accounting for a Committeeman ' ::;  voting s tand 
is limite<.1 by his degree of party loyalty.  
Another effect that a Committeeman ' s  party may have on his 
behavior is propose.cl in our third hypothesis . Presumably ,  a Congress -
man possessing a high electoral margin i s  less likely to vote with 
his party leaders . 
Table 7 describes this relationship for rural members voting 
on agricultural · issues in the 90th Congress . Data examining this 
generalization for the_ 9lst Congress is contained in Table 8 .  We 
discover that in 1967 -196 8 ,  representatives having a lower per�ent-
age of cons tituent votes , follow their party ' s  position more often . 
The· reverse occurs in the next Congres s ,  high electoral margin rural 
Committeemen record 94 percent of their roll-call votes in agreement 
with party leaders . 
Table 7 
Percentage of  Party Support on Farm Issues for 
Rural Congressmen by Electoral Margin, 
90th Congress 
Agricultural Votes 
Support Party 
Oppose Party 
Total 
Rural Committeemen 
Electoral Margin 
High Low 
(N=4) (N=4) 
7 9  .. % 
21 
100% 
92%  
'8. 
100% 
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T<1h I <.· 8 
P c i:-c1.·nt�1gc o[ P:.lrty S u p p o t· t  on F�1 rm Issues for 
Ku r;.il Gongrcs :::men by E l e c toral Margin , 
J\griC\tl tural Votes 
Suppo,rt; Party 
·Oppose �arty 
T o ta l  
91 .s  t Con'gress 
Ru r. <i l. Co11n11 Lt t <.· < ·111< • n 
Eicctor.::i l M.::irg i.n 
IHgh Low 
(N==4) (N=4) 
94% 
6 
100% 
78% 
22 
100'/o 
The next series of  tables present an urban member ' s  party 
support on city roll calls (see Tables 9 and 10) . Support of party 
leaders is greater for those receiving higher percentages of election 
victories . This relationship applies to both periods . 
Table 9 
Percentage of Party Support on City Issues for 
Urban .Congressmen by Electoral Margin, 
90th Congress 
City Votes 
Support Party 
Oppose Party 
Total 
Table 10 
Urban Committeemen 
Electoral Margin 
High Low 
(N==4) <N=?) 
100% 94% 
0 0 
100% 94% 
Percentage of Party Support on City Issues for 
Urban Congressmen by Electoral Margin, 
9lst Congress 
City Votes 
Support Party 
Oppose Party 
Total 
Urban Committeemen 
Electoral Margin 
High Low 
(N=4) (N=3) 
94% 
6 
100% 
83% 
17  
100% 
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Which p<.irty rece ives the greater a l l e giance from it:::; rural 
a �s u c i <.i t: c s ?  Dota found in ·Tables 11 an<l 12 suggei:;t that rega rdless 
of tlw i_r electoral margins , Republicans win this honor in the 90th 
C0ngress . Democratic Committeemen in tile 9lst Congress surpass 
Republicans in party loya lty . Young and M.:itsunaga lea<l Democrats 
in backing party leaders. Quillen and Martin spark the defens ive 
l ine o'f _support for Republicans. 
Table 11 
Party Support of Agricultural Roll Calls 
For Rural Committeemen, by ·P a r ty 
Congress. 
Rural Members 90th 9lst Mean �:.:.:::.=-....:..:.:::!!!:���--"����������=-�_,:;..:=;...;;..���-
High Electoral Margin 
Democrats 
Colmer 
Young 
Ande'j:'son (Tenn.). 
,, Republican 
Quillen 
Low Electoral Margin 
Demo.c rats · 
Sisk 
Matsunaga 
-Republic�ns 
Martin 
Latta 
56' ·1 00 7 1  
89 100 93 
8 :3  10.0 8 9  
88 7 8  8 4  
8 3  100 8 9  
8 9  100 93 
100 56 8 4  
9 4  56 80 
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T:tb I <' 1 2  
P a rty Support of C i t y  Roll C:.i l l s  for 
Urlwn Cnnnni. t t ecmcn, hy P < t r. L:y 
Cong res::; 
ll rh:rn Mt'ml>l•r$ 90th 9 l s t  McDn 
lligh Electoral Margin 
Dcmocr<.1 ts 
0 'Neill 100 83 93 
Pepper 100 100 100 
Republican 
Smith 100 100 100 
Low Electoral Margin 
Democrats 
Madden 88 83 86 
Delaney 100 so 79  
Bolling 88 100 93 
Republican 
Anderson (Il . )  100 100 100 
Urban Republicans join their party leaders in oppos ing city 
projects . Democrat Pepper with a high electoral margin and both 
urban Republicans , Smith and Anderson (Il .) , record 100 percent 
support of their respective parties during both Congresses . In 
addition', O 'Neill and Delaney are in complete agreement with the 
Democratic leadership in the 1 967 -1968 period . Eolling shows 100 
percent support of his party for the 9lst Congress . 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSIONS 
This analysis has examined possible causes for legisla tive 
decis ions . Rural/urban constituency characteristics. were studied 
to determine their affect on Rules Committee members ' voting be­
havior . Other factors included: Committeemen ' s  percentage of 
electoral margin , party loyalty, and ideology. 
The following findings were . drawn from the analysis : 
1 .  Members from rural districts voted for agricultural pro­
grams more often than representatives of urban constituencies . 
Urban members supported rural interests only in the 9lst Congress . 
Democrats , rural and urban, favored agriculture with greater regu­
larity than Republ�cans who also supported farmers . Ideologically, 
l iberals were better boosters than conservatives . Liberals were 
_Democrats , but not all Democrats were libera l .  
2 .  City roll calls received greater support from urban 
Committeemen.  Rural members were divided over urban issues . Gener­
a lly, Democrats voted for urban programs , Republicans opposed them. 
Libera ls , .. rather than conservatives , preferred these measures ·· 
3 .  Rural Committeemen with high electoral margins lent their 
support to agricultural programs . Those from the more competitive 
rural districts usually opposed rural interests . 
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4 .  Urb;.in nH . .!mbcrs .from the more competitive <list'(it:ts 
i:cco nk<l 3 h ighe r pcrt:cnt3gc of support for city programs tlwn their 
cvlleogucs with high elec tor<.J l m;lrgins. 
5 .  Rural members with l ow electoral margins supported their 
p;lrty l c<.J <lcrs ' positions o� agriculture in the 90th Congress more 
vftcn than rural congressmen who ha<l scored high electoral victories . 
Agreement with party on agricultural issues in the 9lst Congress was 
greater for rural Committeemen with high electoral margins . 
6 .  Urban Committee members with high electoral margins 
supported their respective parties ' stands more ' times in both Con-
gresses than did urban representatives with l ow margins . 
The degree of competitiveness of a Rules Committee member ' s  
district did not a ffect his voting decisions t o  the same extent that 
they were influenced by party, rural/urban constituency, or ideology . 
I f  an issue was seen to affect substantial interests in a representa -
tive ' s  const ituency , then he supported those interests.  Generally , 
this support can be better explained by the variables of party l oyalty, 
and ideology rather than by the rural/urban constituency · characteristic.  
This conclusion provides further evidence to  support ·earlier studies 
which reported similar findings .1 
1 Refer to  the works written by Robinson, Froman, Shannon , 
Turner, Truman,  and Mayhew which were discussed in Chapter Three . 
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A<l<l it ional research is needed to cktcrminc the re.li.u b i l ity 
u f  lhesc f ine.lings . Arc the results l imited to the four years or 
do they hove broader opppico bil ity? A similar s tudy should be con­
<lucte<l which would include other periods and other committees . We 
wuuld suggc::;t that the variables be re-examined by using more sophis­
ticated . . techniques of analys is . Finally, the remaining causal 
factors described in the theoretical model could be defined and tested 
for va l idity . For example , the study of institutional characteristics , 
such as seniority and state party delegation are factors which might 
provide additional explanations of behavior .  
In undertaking this research , we realized the limitations 
imposed upon our data by using roll-call votes . They contain certain 
inher�nt ambiguities . For instance, two members .may cast a "nay" 
vote for exactly the opposite reasons : · one because the legislation 
is too fa�-reaching, and the other because he thinks the bill does 
not go far enough . However,  our independent variables were selected 
for the specific purpose of explaining these differences in behavio r .  
Thus , Rules Conunittee members , as d o  other congressmen, rely 
upon many factors in responding to issues . We intended that this 
study should be beneficial in explaining certain factors which cause 
legislative voting behavior. 
APP8i\!DIX A 
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TflDLE 13 
VOTES OH AC:!<ICUL'i'UH/\L HOLL CALJ,8 
DY HlJU�3 COMMI'l"rE:l� Mfi:Mr.f�it�.> MID P/\H'l'Y LF:/1 DF:rt:�.1, 19t';'[ 
Con(�TCG�iional Quarterly Roll Call H wnbor 
Cone.re�:-;�; 10 66 117 lfl7 um J2?, 2?.6 
Colmer ? A F ? ? 1" ? 
�laddcn F · F  A . . F F ? .? 
' Delancy . F F' A F F ? A 
Do.llinG F F A ? ? F F 
O'Neill ? ' F A A F A A 
Sisk ? F A F F F A 
Young F F F ? ? F ? 
Pepper ? F F F F F A 
Matsunaga F F F A A F ? 
Anderson (Tenn, ) F F F F F F A 
Smith ? A A F F ·A· F 
Anderson ( Il, ) F A ? A A F F 
' • 
Martin F F · F F F ·F F 
Quillen F A F F F F ? 
Latta F A A F F F F 
Albert F F F F F F F 
Boggs Ii' F F F F F F 
l' ord ? ·A ? F F ? F 
Arends ? A F F F F ? 
F = Voted, paired, or an ounced For 
A = Voted,. pairedr announced Against 
? = Not voting 
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TABLE llJ. 
VO'rl!:S on ACfUCULTUM.L TIOLL CALL';) 
BY nlJL2S COM.MITTE� Ml�MnEnS AND PARTY LlJ:ADERS ! l'){,H 
Coneror:�zional Qun.rtcrly Roll Call U 111r1bor 
Cnn;';'rc:;sm::i.n .6 J2 33 )6 )'I 57 l'Q 
Colmer A F F li' F I•' ? 
Mad.den F ? A F F A F' 
Dc;lancy A Ii' A F F A F 
Dolline F · A A F I•' A F 
O'Neill F ·  F A ? F A F 
Sisk · F F F F F F F 
Yowig F F F F F F F 
Pepper F F F F F F F 
Matsunaga F F F F F F .. F 
Anderson (Tenn. ) F A A F F A F 
Smith A F F F A F A 
Anderson (i1. ) .A F F A A F F 
Martin A F F F A F F 
Quillen A F F A A F F 
Latta A F F A A F . F 
Albert · F F F F F F F 
Bogss F F F F F F F 
Ford A F F F A F A 
Arends A F F F .A F A 
F =. Voted, pa.ired; or announced For 
A = Voted,. pa.ired� or announced Against 
? = Not voting 
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TABLE ll} (Cont. ) 
VO'rf�S ON . AGRIC lJL·rUML ROiili CAI.LS 
BY nm.ms COMMITTE8 Ml.i�MBJ:!:BS AND PARTY Lf�ADEP.i) ,  l?fAJ 
Congrensional Quart0rly Roll Call Number 
Con;.::ro::;sman 165 166 167 19'·� ?.02 172 212 
Colmer A F !" A F li' 1'" 
Nadd.on ? A A F A .A F 
Delancy F A A A F A F 
Bolling A, F F F · F ? F 
O 'Neill F · F F F F F F 
Sisk A F F F ? F F 
Yotmg F F F F F F F 
· Pepper F F F:· F F ·F F 
Matstmaga F · F F F F F F 
Anderson (Tenn . ., ) F F F F ? F F 
Smith F· A A A A A A 
Anderson: (Il. ) p · A A A A A A 
l'Jl.artin F F F A F . A A 
Quillen · F F F F F F A 
Latta F F A F F F A 
Albert A F F F F F F 
Bo15gs F F F F F F A 
Ford · F F A A F F A 
Arends F A A A :B" F A 
F = Voted1 paired� or anno'Unced For 
A = Voted, paired� or announced. Against 
? = Not voting ·· 
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TABLE 15 
VOTES ON AGRICULTURAL ROLL CALLS 
BY RULES COMMITTEE MEMnJ�HS AND PARTY LR/\DERS 2 12G9 
.Concrccsional Quarterly Roll-Call ll wn bor 
Conc;.r.ct;;;man 28 101 
Colmer ? F 
. . 
Maddun . F A 
· n0lanoy · F A 
Bollins F A 
O 'Neill F A 
Sisk F F 
Young F F 
:Pepper F A 
Matstmaga F F 
Anderson (Tenn. ) F F 
Smith ? · . A  
Anderson ( Il. ) F F 
Martin ? ? 
Quillen F A 
Latta F .  A 
Albert F F 
Boggs F F 
Ford F F 
Arends F F 
F = Voted, paired� or announced For 
A = Voted, paired,. or announced Against 
? = Not voting . . · · 
· 
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l•' 
A 
A 
F 
1'' 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
A 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
Ii' 
F 
133 
l•' 
A 
A 
F 
A 
F 
F 
A 
F 
F 
A 
A 
F 
F 
A 
F 
F 
F 
F 
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. TABLE 16 
VOT_E:-.; OH AGJ\ICULTUP.AL HOLL CALLS 
DY nULP.�.J 'COMMITTf:8 I'!l' �i{!;P.HS MW PARTY L!�/\Dl�KJ, 19?0 
r. on.'·; r.cr; :; man 
Colmdr 
Madden 
Delancy 
Bollin(; 
O 'Neill 
Sisk 
YounfS 
Pepper 
Matsunaga 
Anderson (Tenn. ) 
Smith 
Anderson (Il. ) 
Martin 
Quillen 
Latta 
Albert 
Bogc;s 
Ford 
Arends 
:r.� = Voted . ' A = Voted,-
paired,. 
paired� 
Concressional Quarterly Holl Call number 
11n 11.,Jl� 191.r 210 21�1 260 
A Ii' F F F . l•' 
A .}� A A F 1i " 
A A A A A A 
F li' . . F F F F 
F A F F F F 
F F F F F F 
F F F F F F 
F F F .  F F F 
F F F F F ' F 
A F F F F F 
F A A A A A 
A F F A A - A 
A A A A A A 
A · F F A F A 
A A · F A F A 
F '  F F F F F 
A F F F F F 
F F F A A · A 
A F F A A A 
or announced F.or 
or an�ounc�d Against 
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'T'ADLE 17 
VOTES ON URBAN ROLL CALL3 
nY nuLES COMTHTTJ.i;E f·1I'!r·�n1£HS AND PARTY LEADiI:D3 , l'.]G'I 
Cone;rc:::;sional Quarterly Roll Call Humber 
Conr:r0.0sman . 55 .5G 176 182 
Colmer A A A A 
Madden I•' F Ii' ? 
Delancy F F .F' F 
Bolling F F F F 
O 'Neill F F F F 
Sisk F F F F 
Young F A F F 
Pepper F F F '. F  
Matsunaga F F F ' F  
Anderson (Tenn. ) F F A F 
Smith A A A A 
Anderson (Il. ) A F A A 
l'l...a.rtin A F A A 
Quillen A F . A A 
Latta A A A A 
Albert F F F F 
Boecs F F F F 
Ford A A A A 
Rrcncfo A F A A 
F = Voted, paireq..1 or announced For 
A = Voted,. paired .. or ann�unced Against 
? = Not voting 
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TADLE 18 
VOTES ON URBAN ROLL CALLS 
DY RULBS COMNITTI�E N8Mn:J:ns Mm PARTY LF.A m�ns l 12M� 
Congre:::;sional Quarterly noll Call Number 
Conr:rc::.sman 6l� 127 128 l?.9 . 160 
Colmer A A A A A 
Madden F F F F . Ii .. 
Delaney F F li' F F 
Bolline; F F F F ? 
O'Neill F F F F F 
Sisk F F F F F 
Yo-ung F A F F F 
Pepper F . F  F . F F .
M.atsunga F F F F F. 
Anderson (Tenn , )  F F F F F 
Smith A A A A A 
�nderson (Il, ) . A A A F F 
Martin A A A A A 
Quillen A A A F F 
Latta A A A A F 
Albert F F F F. F 
Boggs F F A F F 
Ford A · A A F F 
/\rends A A A A A 
F = Voted,. paired, or announced For 
A = Voted, paired� or arinoun�ed Against 
1 � Not voting 
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TABLE 19 
VOTE8 ON AN Ul1J3AN ROLL CALL 
DY .!WLF.S CONMITTEr: m;;�rnF.ns AND PARTY T.iEADEnS , 1962 
. Cone:rcssional Quarterly Roll-Call Number 
Ccm,n:rcssman 
Colmer A 
Madden F 
Delancy A 
Bolling .F' 
O'Neill A 
Sisk · F 
Young F 
Pepper F 
.Matsunaga F 
Anderson (Tenn. ) F 
Smith F 
Anderson (Il. ) F 
Martin F 
F 
Latta A 
Albert F 
Boggs ·F 
Ford F 
Arends F 
F = Voted, pa.ired, or annoUn.ced For 
A = Voted• pair�d •. or announced Against 
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TABLE 20 
VO'f ES ON URBAN nOLL CALLS 
DY RULF.S COMMITTEE ME:�1DE:RS AND PARTY LEADEf!S , 1970 
Consrrczsional Quarterly Roll-Call Number 
Congressman 103 133 158 182 ?.h6 
Colmer A ? A A A 
Naddcn A F F ? F 
Delaney A F Ii' A F 
J3ollinG F F F li' F 
O 'Neill F F F F F 
Sisk · p F F F F 
Young A F F F ·1 
Pepper F F F F F 
Matsunaga F F F F F 
Anderson (Tenn. ) A F F F F 
Smith A A A A A 
Anderson (Il, ) A A A A A 
Martin A A A ? A 
Quillen · A F A A A 
Latta A A A A F 
Albert F F F ? F 
Boggs F F F F F 
I1'ord A A A A A 
Arends A A A A A 
F = Voted . , paired,. or announced For 
A = Voted , paired, or announced Against 
? ::: Not voting 
APPENDIX B 
r-l rd 
0 ro 
t) ==:: : 
Col.mer 7 
Madden '7 
Delaney 11 Jl 
Bolling 1.5 28 
O'Neill 14 26 
Sisk 19 27 
Yo�1g 23 21 
Pepper 18 28 
Mats u.11aga 20 25 
A_11de.rson 21 27 
FIGURE 7 
Hatrix of Agreement Between Democratic 
Rules Committee Henbers 0.!1 l�6 Roll Calls 
- - - - ... , 
r.-1- r-l Q) � (l) 0 z (/) 0 A � .. ·rl 0 ti) � 
11 15 14 . 19 21 -
31 28 26 2'7 21 
2:3 28 . 21 21 
23 32 3'l 11 
28 32 J'l 10 
.23 ·35 35 ·. 3-') 
21 31 30 3� 
26 34 38 40 1t-� "'  
22 35' 35 39 19 . .  
23 32 31 36 16 
Pl 
C) 
A.c 
. 
18 
28 
" /  GO 
il� 
18 
40 
16 
40 
16 
+' 
m ·-· � 
20 
'":" ·..-� -
2" 
2? 
1 ') 
1 �  
')Q 
�---'- • 
1; ') 
"' / 
... ,) 
r rd � 
21 
2? 
21 
12 
�l 
�6 
35 
1 <  
· "' 
,... .. 
)'-"' 
C'-
0 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
l 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
: 
61 
FIGUfllE 8 
Matrix of A(�rccmcnt :ik.r�Hcon Republican 
Rules Committee Member::; on J.�6 Roll Calls 
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APPENDIX C 
-Committeerna:l 
O'Neill 
Colmer 
Young 
Pepp0r . . 
Anderson (Tenn, ) · 
Quillen 
Latta 
Smith 
Sisk 
Anderson ( Il, ) 
.Matsunaga 
iDclaney 
.Bolling 
:Martine 
: 
:Madden 
TABLE 21 
PERCENTAGE OF CONGRESSirniAL DISTRICT VOTES 
RECEIVED BY RULES COHNIT"TEr!: HE1"lDERS 
1962 1964 
-
73. 0fo 100, 0% 
100 . 0  100 , 0  
70, 4 77. 5  
57 . 6  65, 7 
81,7  78. 4 
53 . 9  71. 7 
. 70, 4 65.9 
70.6 67.9 
71. 9 q6, 8 
66. 9  56 l• • r 
63 , 6  61, 1  
58. 7  65, 9 
58 . 9  67 . <J  
65, 6 52, s. 
60, 5 63 , 7  
---� -------
·�966 
100, 0% 
70. 0 
100, 0 
99, 8  
79-. 6 
87 , 1  
75.3 
73 . 4  
71.)  
73 , 0  
67. 7  
53 . 5  
61 , 2 
73 , 0  
.5S . • 3 
---
1968 + 1970 
-lOO. 0% 
. 
.100, Oi& �-
100 , 0  90, 0 
100, 0 100, 0 
76 , 6  100, 0  
59 . 4  82, 0 
85, 2 68. 0  
71 � 2  71 , 0 
69, 4  70, 0 
62 , 5  68, 0  
73, 0  68, 0 
66. 6  73. 0 
49.7 92 , 0  
65, 4 62, 0  
67 , 8  _5S, O 
56 . 7  66, 0  
k1era:z,2. 
-·---�--
. 94. 6% 
92 , 0  
89 , 6  
79 . 9· 
76, 2  
7J . 2  
70 , 8  
70,3 
68 , 1  
67. . 5  
66.4  
64. o  
63 ; 1 
61,4 
61, 0  
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